Beyond Truth-Telling: Preference Estimation with Centralized School Choice and College Admissions
Beyond Truth-Telling: Preference Estimation with Centralized School Choice and College Admissions
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DOI：
10.1257/aer.20151422
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发表时间：
2019-04-01
影响因子：
10.7
通讯作者：
He, Yinghua
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Fack, Gabrielle;Grenet, Julien;He, Yinghua
我们提出了新的方法来估计学生的偏好与匹配机制的数据，特别是盖尔-夏普利推迟接受。即使这种机制是防策略的，假设学生在申请中真实地对学校进行排名也可能是限制性的。我们表明，当学生被严格排名的一些事先已知的优先级指数（例如，考试成绩），稳定性是一个合理的和较弱的假设，这意味着每个学生都与她最喜欢的学校/学院相匹配，她有资格在事后。这些方法在模拟中得到了说明，并应用于巴黎的学校选择。我们讨论每种方法在现实生活中更合适的时候。(JEL D11、D12、D82、I23）
We propose novel approaches to estimating student preferences with data from matching mechanisms, especially the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance. Even if the mechanism is strategy-proof, assuming that students truthfully rank schools in applications may he restrictive. We show that when students are ranked strictly by some ex ante known priority index (e.g., test scores), stability is a plausible and weaker assumption, implying that every student is matched with her favorite school/college among those she qualifies for ex post. The methods are illustrated in simulations and applied to school choice in Paris. We discuss when each approach is more appropriate in real-life settings. (JEL D11, D12, D82, I23)