Can vouchers reduce elite capture of local development projects? Experimental evidence from the Solomon Islands
Can vouchers reduce elite capture of local development projects? Experimental evidence from the Solomon Islands
复制标题
DOI：
10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.02.011
复制
发表时间：
2018-04-01
影响因子：
9.8
通讯作者：
Weber, R. A.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Beath, A.;BenYishay, A.;Weber, R. A.
地方公共产品的外部融资可能会减少公民监督，加剧精英捕获，并产生对普通民众来说不是最优的政策结果，从而潜在地造成“政治资源诅咒”。本文通过实验测试了一种新机制，该机制旨在减轻精英对地方发展项目的捕获。控制社区获得了大笔赠款，用于资助当地的公共产品，而治疗社区的家庭则获得了代金券，他们可以为公共产品做出贡献，也可以以折扣价兑换私人资本产品。我们发现，将代金券作为一种援助发放机制，增加了社区对地方公共决策的参与，改变了分配结果的性质，提高了社区对分配结果的满意度。
External financing of local public goods can potentially create 'political resource curses' by reducing citizen oversight, exacerbating elite capture, and producing policy outcomes that are sub-optimal for the general population. This paper experimentally tests a novel mechanism that seeks to mitigate elite capture of local development projects. Control communities are provided with block grants to fund local public goods, while households in treatment communities are provided with vouchers that they may either contribute to a public good or redeem at a discount for a private capital good. We find that the use of vouchers as a mechanism for aid delivery increases community participation in local public decision-making, changes the nature of allocation outcomes, and improves community satisfaction with allocation outcomes.