License and Entry Strategies for an Outside Innovator Under Duopoly
License and Entry Strategies for an Outside Innovator Under Duopoly
复制标题
双头垄断下外部创新者的许可和进入策略
DOI：
10.1007/s40797-017-0048-0
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发表时间：
2017
影响因子：
1.2
通讯作者：
Yasuhito Tanaka
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Masahiko Hattori;Yasuhito Tanaka
在Kamien和Tauman的命题4 （Q J Econ 101:471-492, 1986）中，假设具有固定费用许可的线性需求和成本函数，认为对于寡头垄断下的外部创新企业，当企业数量很少（或非常大）时，将其降低成本的技术许可给现有企业进入市场的策略（许可进入策略）比将其技术许可给现有企业而不进入市场的策略（许可不进入策略）更有利可图。然而，他们的结果取决于他们对许可费的定义，如果创新企业能够进入市场，那么这是不合适的。如果我们根据创新企业进入的威胁采用另一种更合适的定义，在线性需求和成本函数的情况下，无进入许可策略更有利可图。我们还研究了二次代价函数的问题，在这种情况下，使用许可策略进入可能是最优的。进一步，我们将证明在许可方获得新技术的所有利益的假设下，当许可费用被确定时，创新企业的最优策略与根据纳什议价解确定许可费用时的最优策略是相同的。
In Proposition 4 of Kamien and Tauman (Q J Econ 101:471–492, 1986), assuming linear demand and cost functions with fixed fee licensing it was argued that for the outside innovating firm under oligopoly when the number of firms is small (or very large), strategy to enter the market with license of its cost-reducing technology to the incumbent firm (entry with license strategy) is more profitable than strategy to license its technology to the incumbent firm without entering the market (license without entry strategy). However, their result depends on their definition of license fee, and it is inappropriate if the innovating firm can enter the market. If we adopt an alternative more appropriate definition based on the threat by entry of the innovating firm, license without entry strategy is more profitable in the case of linear demand and cost functions. Also we investigate the problem in the case of quadratic cost functions in which entry with license strategy may be optimal. Further we will show that the optimal strategies for the innovating firm when license fees are determined under the assumption that the licensor takes all benefit of new technology and its optimal strategies when license fees are determined according to Nash bargaining solution are the same.