Resource scarcity, and democratic elections in commons dilemmas: An experiment on forest use in Ethiopia
Resource scarcity, and democratic elections in commons dilemmas: An experiment on forest use in Ethiopia
复制标题
DOI：
10.1016/j.ecolecon.2015.04.005
复制
发表时间：
2015-06-01
影响因子：
7
通讯作者：
Nuppenau, Ernst-August
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Gatiso, Tsegaye T.;Vollan, Bjoern;Nuppenau, Ernst-August
我们通过动态的野外实验室实验研究了资源稀缺对人类行为的影响，这些实验的框架是从埃塞俄比亚的一个集体管理的森林中提取树木。面对资源稀缺的受试者比面对更丰富的公地条件的受试者更不合作。当公地的初始条件相对丰富时，资源使用者似乎更有可能建立一种互惠的规范。我们进一步发现，尤其是男性在资源稀缺的情况下过度捕捞，这与研究发现男性更具竞争力是一致的。我们还测试了不同的政策。我们发现，无论资源是稀缺还是丰富，通过选举获得合法性都会增加合作。当实施制裁时，我们观察到在资源丰富的情况下进行合作的内在动机的挤出效应。在资源稀缺的情况下，施加的制裁不会导致排挤效应，但民主选举要有效得多。(C)2015爱思唯尔B.V.保留所有权利。
We study the effect of resource scarcity on human behavior using dynamic lab-in-the-field experiments which are framed around the extraction of trees from a communally managed forest in Ethiopia. Subjects who faced resource scarcity were less cooperative than those who faced more abundant commons condition. When initial condition of the commons was relatively abundant it seemed more likely that resource users established a norm of reciprocity. We further found that especially men overharvested under resource scarcity which is in line with studies that had found men to be more competitive. We also tested different policies. We found that gaining legitimacy through election increases cooperation independent of whether the resource is scarce or abundant. When sanctions were imposed we observed a crowding-out effect of intrinsic motivation to cooperate under resource abundance. With resource scarcity imposed sanctions did not lead to a crowding-out effect but democratic elections were by far more effective. (c) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.