Efficient Stabilization of Cooperative Matching Games
Efficient Stabilization of Cooperative Matching Games
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DOI:
10.1016/j.tcs.2017.03.020
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发表时间:
2016-05
期刊:
影响因子:
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通讯作者:
Takehiro Ito;Naonori Kakimura;Naoyuki Kamiyama;Yusuke Kobayashi;Y. Okamoto
中科院分区:
文献类型:
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作者:
Takehiro Ito;Naonori Kakimura;Naoyuki Kamiyama;Yusuke Kobayashi;Y. Okamoto
Cooperative matching games have drawn much interest partly because of the connection with bargaining solutions in the networking environment. However, it is not always guaranteed that a network under investigation gives rise to a stable bargaining outcome. To address this issue, we consider a modification process, calledstabilization, that yields a network with stable outcomes, where the modification should be as small as possible. Therefore, the problem is cast to a combinatorial-optimization problem in a graph. Recently, the stabilization by edge removal was shown to beNP-hard. On the contrary, in this paper, we show that other possible ways of stabilization, namely, edge addition, vertex removal and vertex addition, are all polynomial-time solvable. Thus, we obtain a complete complexity-theoretic classification of the natural four variants of the network stabilization problem. We further study weighted variants and prove that the variants for edge addition and vertex removal areNP-hard.