Phenomenal consciousness with infallible self-representation
Phenomenal consciousness with infallible self-representation
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具有无误的自我表现的现象意识
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发表时间：
2011
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通讯作者：
C. Kidd
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作者：
C. Kidd
在本文中，我反对乔什·韦斯伯格最近捍卫的主张，即现象意识的自我表征方法的某种版本无法避免一系列困扰高阶方法的问题。这些问题专门针对允许高阶误述或在自我表征理论领域中的自我误述的理论而出现。为了回应韦斯伯格，我阐述了一种现象意识的自我表征理论，根据该理论，在有意识的心理状态背景下表征的自我表征不可能歪曲其对象。这种偶然的绝对正确性使得该理论既承认自我歪曲的（逻辑）可能性，又避免了自我歪曲的问题。进一步扩展韦斯伯格的工作，我考虑并揭示了由克赖格尔、范古利克和根纳罗提出的其他三个自我表征模型的缺点，以便表明每个模型都表明了这种绝对正确性的必要性。然后我认为，只有当我们将（1）一种新弗雷格式的直接指称的索引内容归因于自我表征心理状态，以及（2）将某种本体论结构归因于复杂的意识心理状态（这些索引自我表征是其中的一部分）时，偶然无误原则在自然主义的基础上才是可接受的。在这些部分中，我借鉴了佩里和卡普兰工作中的想法来阐明内部表征状态的上下文相关语义结构。
In this paper, I argue against the claim recently defended by Josh Weisberg that a certain version of the self-representational approach to phenomenal consciousness cannot avoid a set of problems that have plagued higher-order approaches. These problems arise specifically for theories that allow for higher-order misrepresentation or—in the domain of self-representational theories—self-misrepresentation. In response to Weisberg, I articulate a self-representational theory of phenomenal consciousness according to which it is contingently impossible for self-representations tokened in the context of a conscious mental state to misrepresent their objects. This contingent infallibility allows the theory to both acknowledge the (logical) possibility of self-misrepresentation and avoid the problems of self-misrepresentation. Expanding further on Weisberg’s work, I consider and reveal the shortcomings of three other self-representational models—put forward by Kreigel, Van Gulick, and Gennaro—in order to show that each indicates the need for this sort of infallibility. I then argue that contingent infallibility is in principle acceptable on naturalistic grounds only if we attribute (1) a neo-Fregean kind of directly referring, indexical content to self-representational mental states and (2) a certain ontological structure to the complex conscious mental states of which these indexical self-representations are a part. In these sections I draw on ideas from the work of Perry and Kaplan to articulate the context-dependent semantic structure of inner-representational states.