Why Parliament Now Decides on War: Tracing the Growth of the Parliamentary Prerogative through Syria, Libya and Iraq
Why Parliament Now Decides on War: Tracing the Growth of the Parliamentary Prerogative through Syria, Libya and Iraq
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为什么议会现在决定战争：追踪叙利亚、利比亚和伊拉克议会特权的增长
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发表时间：
2015
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通讯作者：
J. Strong
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作者：
J. Strong
研究亮点和摘要先例 在有关伊拉克、利比亚和叙利亚的辩论中确立了一项新的议会特权，即议员必须在合法发起军事行动之前投票。托尼·布莱尔承认伊拉克公投是为了支撑工党后座议员的支持，因为他坚信自己会获胜，而且无论如何他都不愿意改变路线。戴维·卡梅伦允许对利比亚进行投票，因为他相信议会应该有发言权，因为联合国的支持意味着他一定会获胜，并因为不是布莱尔而赢得喝彩。尽管叙利亚问题具有更大的政治敏感性，但卡梅伦随后不得不允许就叙利亚问题进行投票。他对投票处理不当，失败了，并感到被迫退出拟议的军事行动。这三个先例共同构成了新的制宪会议，无论法律是否正式修改，它将对未来的行政部门构成约束。议会现在决定英国何时参战。 2013 年 8 月 29 日投票反对对叙利亚进行军事干预，维护了一项新的议会特权，该特权是通过对伊拉克和利比亚早期行动的辩论而逐渐发展起来的。虽然学术界和许多英国政治精英继续关注历史悠久的王室特权赋予首相的自由，但本文认为，这种自由受到议会同行的严重限制。它追溯了政治条件、政策制定者个人偏好以及不成文英国宪法的传统性质如何允许议会在未经历届政府同意的情况下介入决策过程。报告的结论是，议员们未来将期望有权对海外部署武装部队的提案进行投票，而军事行动的合法性将取决于政府赢得这样的投票。
Research Highlights and Abstract Precedents set in debates over Iraq, Libya and Syria established a new parliamentary prerogative, that MPs must vote before military action can legitimately be launched. Tony Blair conceded the Iraq vote to shore up Labour back-bench support, because he was convinced he would win, and because he was unwilling to change course regardless. David Cameron allowed a vote on Libya because he believed parliament should have a say, because UN support meant he was certain to win, and to gain plaudits for not being Blair. Cameron then had to allow a vote on Syria despite its greater political sensitivity. He mishandled the vote, and lost, and felt constrained to pull out of mooted military action. Collectively these three precedents comprise a new constitutional convention, which will constrain the executive in future whether the law is formally changed or not. Parliament now decides when Britain goes to war. The vote against military intervention in Syria on 29 August 2013 upheld a new parliamentary prerogative that gradually developed through debates over earlier actions in Iraq and Libya. While the academic community and much of the British political elite continue to focus on the free rein granted to prime ministers by the historic royal prerogative, this article argues it is critically constrained by its parliamentary counterpart. It traces the way political conditions, individual policymaker preferences, and the conventional nature of the unwritten British constitution allowed parliament to insert itself into the policymaking process without the consent of successive governments. It concludes that MPs will in future expect the right to vote on proposals to deploy the armed forces overseas, and that the legitimacy of military action will depend on the government winning such a vote.