Sunk Cost and Entry-Exit Decisions under Individual Transferable Quotas: Why Industry Restructuring Is Delayed
Sunk Cost and Entry-Exit Decisions under Individual Transferable Quotas: Why Industry Restructuring Is Delayed
复制标题
个人可转让配额下的沉没成本与进出决策：行业重组为何迟缓
DOI：
10.3368/le.81.3.363
复制
发表时间：
2005
期刊：
影响因子：
1.4
通讯作者：
Henning P. Jørgensen
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
N. Vestergaard;F. Jensen;Henning P. Jørgensen
The paper shows that explicit modelling of sunk cost and a firm’s entry-exit decision in a traditional deterministic investment model may give an explanation of the slow transition to the optimal fleet structure following the introduction of individual transferable quotas (ITQs). The analysis shows that the annual lease unit price of quota may be in a range where the long-run fleet structure will not be attainable at once. Over time, firms with zero gross investment as optimal behavior may leave the industry as the capital decays and over the transition period the optimal fleet structure prevails. (JEL Q22)
