VARIANTS OF UNCERTAINTY
VARIANTS OF UNCERTAINTY
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DOI：
10.1016/0010-0277(82)90023-3
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发表时间：
1982-01-01
期刊：
影响因子：
3.4
通讯作者：
TVERSKY, A
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
KAHNEMAN, D;TVERSKY, A
与采用单一概率概念的人类判断和决策的正式理论相反，对不确定性反应的心理分析揭示了可能遵循不同规则的各种过程和经验。回顾了知觉中期望和惊奇的基本形式。描述了一种现象学分析，它区分了不确定性的外部归因（倾向）和不确定性的内部归因（无知）。通过关注频率、倾向、论证的强度或信心的直接经验，可以以不同的模式对不确定性进行评估。这些不确定性的变体与自然语言中的不同表达有关；它们也暗示了对概率的相互竞争的哲学解释。
In contrast to formal theories of human judgment and decision, which employ a single notion of probability, psychological analyses of responses to uncertainty reveal a wide variety of processes and experiences which may follow different rules. Elementary forms of expectation and surprise in perception are reviewed. A phenomenological analysis is described which distinguishes external attributions of uncertainty (disposition) from internal attributions of uncertainty (ignorance). Assessments of uncertainty can be made in different modes by focusing on frequencies, propensities, the strength of arguments, or direct experiences of confidence. These variants of uncertainty are associated with different expressions in natural language; they are also suggestive of competing philosophical interpretations of probability.