Self-selection into payments for ecosystem services programs
Self-selection into payments for ecosystem services programs
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DOI：
10.1073/pnas.1802868115
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发表时间：
2019-03-19
影响因子：
11.1
通讯作者：
Jayachandran, Seema
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Jack, B. Kelsey;Jayachandran, Seema
长期以来，生态系统服务付费项目（PES）的设计者和资助者一直担心，付费会流向那些即使没有该项目也会保护森林的土地所有者，从而破坏了生态系统服务的环境效益（“附加性”）和成本效益。如果土地所有者根据他们将要承担的保护多少自行选择PES计划，那么那些计划保护的人应该总是参加。本文讨论了一个鲜为人知的事实，即招生往往也基于其他因素。注册的麻烦或注册的财务成本（例如，购买幼苗）会影响谁参加PES项目。这些注册成本降低了总体的使用率，而且重要的是，它们还可以影响选择加入该计划的土地所有者的组成，从而影响每个注册者的环境效益。如果注册成本对于无论如何都会保留的土地所有者来说系统性地更高（从而阻止他们注册），那么每个注册者的收益就会增加。或者，如果注册成本与现状保护的相关性相反，那么注册成本可能会抑制每个注册者的收益。我们用两项随机试验的证据来说明这些观点，这些试验是针对乌干达和马拉维旨在增加森林覆盖率的PES项目进行的。我们还讨论了在其他领域，如社会福利，政策设计者如何有目的地调整项目注册的成本，以影响参与者的组成并提高成本效益。我们建议可以将这些针对目标的想法纳入PES计划的设计中。
Designers and funders of payments for ecosystem services (PES) programs have long worried that payments flow to landholders who would have conserved forests even without the program, undermining the environmental benefits ("additionality") and cost-effectiveness of PES. If landholders self-select into PES programs based on how much conservation they were going to undertake anyway, then those who were planning to conserve should always enroll. This paper discusses the less-appreciated fact that enrollment is often based on other factors too. The hassle of signing up or financial costs of enrollment (e.g., purchasing seedlings) can affect who participates in a PES program. These enrollment costs reduce overall take-up, and, importantly, they can also influence the composition of landholders who select into the program- and thereby the program's environmental benefits per enrollee. Enrollment costs can increase a program's benefits per enrollee if they are systematically higher for (and thus deter enrollment by) landholders who would have conserved anyway. Alternatively, enrollment costs can dampen per-enrollee benefits if their correlation with status-quo conservation is in the opposite direction. We illustrate these points with evidence from two studies of randomized trials of PES programs aimed at increasing forest cover in Uganda and Malawi. We also discuss how in other sectors, such as social welfare, policy designers have purposefully adjusted the costs of program enrollment to influence the composition of participants and improve cost-effectiveness. We propose that these ideas for targeting could be incorporated into the design of PES programs.