The Epistemological Bias of Ethics Review
The Epistemological Bias of Ethics Review
复制标题
伦理审查的认识论偏见
DOI：
10.1177/1077800407304469
复制
发表时间：
2007
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Kate Holland
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Kate Holland
本文调查了一所大学的研究伦理委员会在拒绝采访被诊断患有精神疾病的人的申请时所关注的问题。委员会的关切包括参与者和作为研究者的提交人的安全，提交人缺乏培训和临床专业知识，她披露了过去的精神疾病诊断，需要制定处理任何紧急情况的规定，以及需要筛选潜在的参与者，以确保他们足够健康，可以给予知情同意。这些家长式的和医学衍生的关注反映了对精神疾病的假设，这些假设受到第一人称视角、精神健康社会运动和后精神病学领域新出现的工作的挑战。本文提出了一些人类研究伦理委员会遵循的伦理程序，以对抗当前伦理审查框架的认识论偏见，特别是因为它限制了心理健康研究中的定性调查和第一人称视角。
This article investigates the concerns of a university research ethics committee in rejecting an application to interview people diagnosed with a mental illness. The committee's concerns included the safety of participants and the author as the researcher, the author's lack of training and clinical expertise, her disclosure of a past diagnosis of mental illness, the need for provisions to handle any emergencies, and the need to screen potential participants to ensure they were well enough to give informed consent. These paternalistic and medically derived concerns reflect assumptions about mental illness that are challenged by first-person perspectives, social movements in mental health, and newly emerging work within postpsychiatry. The article proposes some ethical procedures for human research ethics committees to follow to counter the epistemological bias of the current ethics review framework, particularly as it serves to constrain qualitative inquiry and first-person perspectives in mental health research.