Unobserved Heterogeneity in Matching Games

Unobserved Heterogeneity in Matching Games
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DOI:
10.1086/697740
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发表时间:
2018-07
影响因子:
8.2
通讯作者:
Jeremy T. Fox;Chenyu Yang;David H. Hsu
Jeremy T. Fox;Chenyu Yang;David H. Hsu
中科院分区:
经济学1区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Jeremy T. Fox;Chenyu Yang;David H. Hsu

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在双边匹配博弈中,代理人的特征在匹配市场的典型数据中是无法观察到的。我们使用谁与谁匹配的数据来研究未观察到的特征分布的识别。总的来说,我们考虑了多对多匹配和交易匹配。如果没有不匹配代理的信息,无法完全恢复匹配特定的不可观察对象的分布,但是可以识别不可观察对象的组合分布,我们称之为不可观察互补性。在不匹配的代理上使用数据可以恢复标识。
Agents in two-sided matching games vary in characteristics that are unobservable in typical data on matching markets. We investigate the identification of the distribution of unobserved characteristics using data on who matches with whom. In full generality, we consider many-to-many matching and matching with trades. The distribution of match-specific unobservables cannot be fully recovered without information on unmatched agents, but the distribution of a combination of unobservables, which we call unobserved complementarities, can be identified. Using data on unmatched agents restores identification.