Managerial Incentives and Investment in R&D in Large Multiproduct Firms
Managerial Incentives and Investment in R&D in Large Multiproduct Firms
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管理激励和 R 投资
DOI：
10.1287/orsc.4.2.325
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发表时间：
1993
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
C. Hill
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
R. Hoskisson;M. Hitt;C. Hill
对大公司部门经理的激励会影响他们的风险取向，从而影响他们对研发的投资决策。本文回顾了相关理论，并假设基于财务业绩的部门经理激励性薪酬与以R&D强度衡量的风险承担负相关。对184家美国大企业的研究结果表明，在控制了行业R&D强度、企业多元化、规模和集团结构之后，基于短期（年度）部门财务业绩的激励与企业总R&D强度呈负相关。此外，研究结果表明，强调长期的财务激励可能会减轻这些激励措施和R&D强度之间的负相关关系，但不会促进风险承担。结果表明，强调战略控制的重要性[根据对拟议战略的业务理解（战略标准）评估部门经理]，而不是使用财务控制[根据财务业绩（通常是年度ROI）评估部门经理]。然而，随着公司的多样化，财务控制的使用变得越来越普遍。多元化增加了公司高管的控制范围和部门之间的多样性。在高度多元化的公司中，企业高管不再能够完全了解多个不同部门的运营。因此，他们不仅必须将业务权力下放到各司，而且也不能使用战略标准来评价各司的管理人员。因此，他们开始强调财务控制。基于短期财务结果的激励措施所导致的风险规避的转变可能对公司的长期业绩产生重要影响。本研究的结果具有长期的竞争力，特别是对企业的R&D密集型产业的R&D支出可能会影响一个公司的竞争地位。
Incentives for division managers in large firms affect their risk orientation and thus their decisions to invest in R&D. This paper reviews theory and hypothesizes that division managers' incentive compensation that is based on financial performance is negatively related to risk taking as measured by R&D intensity. Results of a study of 184 major U.S. firms suggest that incentives based on short-term (annual) division financial performance are negatively related to total firm R&D intensity after controlling for industry R&D intensity, firm diversification, size and group structure. Furthermore, the results suggest that an emphasis on long-term financial incentives may mitigate the negative relationship between these incentives and R&D intensity, but does not promote risk taking. The results suggest the importance of emphasizing strategic controls [evaluating division managers based on operational understanding of strategies proposed (strategic criteria)] as opposed to the use of financial controls [evaluating division managers based on financial performance (often annual ROI)]. However, the use of financial controls becomes more common as firms diversify. Diversification increases the span of control of corporate executives and the diversity among divisions. In highly diversified firms, corporate executives are no longer able to fully understand the operations of the multiple and diverse divisions. Thus, they must not only decentralize operating authority to divisions, but they also cannot use strategic criteria to evaluate division managers. As a result, they begin to emphasize financial controls. The shift toward risk aversion caused by the use of incentives based on short-term financial outcomes can have important implications for long-term firm performance. The results of this study have implications for long-term competitiveness, especially for firms in R&D intensive industries where R&D expenditures may affect a firm's competitive position.