Dynamic indirect reciprocity; When is indirect reciprocity bounded by group membership?
Dynamic indirect reciprocity; When is indirect reciprocity bounded by group membership?
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动态间接互惠；
DOI：
10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2022.12.001
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发表时间：
2023
影响因子：
5.1
通讯作者：
Mifune Nobuhiro
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Imada Hirotaka;Romano Angelo;Mifune Nobuhiro
间接互惠是基于声誉的合作的强大驱动力，之前的研究已经提供了充分的证据，说明间接互惠何时以及如何引导合作与他人合作。然而，目前的经验文献对于间接互惠的领域存在着混合的证据；一些研究表明，人们假设组内成员而不是组外成员属于相同的间接互惠系统，因此他们只对组内成员表现出基于声誉的合作(即有界的间接互惠)。其他研究发现，人们对群外成员也表现出基于声誉的合作(即无限间接互惠)。因此，间接互惠何时以集团成员身份为界限仍不清楚。我们认为，间接互惠的范围取决于声誉后果(即直接合作的后果)的线索的存在。我们进一步提出了一种新的视角--动态间接互惠视角，它融合了有界和无界的间接互惠视角。我们进行了一项预先登记的研究(N=11800)，并找到了支持这一观点的部分证据。首先，合作条件之间的差异很小，不符合观点。然而，对群体间合作的心理基础的探索性分析表明，声誉操纵(即群体成员资格知识操纵)通过增加直接伙伴的期望合作来增加合作，而不考虑他们的群体成员在声誉后果提示存在的情况下。然而，当直接伴侣是组内成员时，当没有声誉后果的线索时，这种间接影响就会被观察到。总体而言，我们的发现强调了一个新的间接互惠的一般原则：声誉后果的线索决定了间接互惠的感知领域，并影响到个人是否将他们的合作条件限制在直接互动伙伴的群体成员资格上。
Indirect reciprocity is a strong driver of reputation-based cooperation and previous studies have offered ample evidence as to when and how it guides cooperation towards others. However, the current empirical literature suffers from mixed evidence about the realm of indirect reciprocity; some studies showed that people assume that in-group members, but not out-group members, belong to the same system of indirect reciprocity and they, thus, display reputation-based cooperation only towards in-group members (i.e., bounded indirect reciprocity). Other studies found that people display reputation-based cooperation towards out-group members as well (i.e., unbounded indirect reciprocity). It thus remains unclear when indirect reciprocity is bounded by group membership. We argue that the realm of indirect reciprocity is conditional to the presence of cues of reputational consequences (i.e., consequences of immediate cooperation). We further propose a new perspective, the dynamic indirect reciprocity perspective, which integrates the bounded and unbounded indirect reciprocity perspectives. We conducted a preregistered study (N= 1800) and found partial evidence for the perspective. First, between-condition differences in cooperation were very small and were not in line with the perspective. However, exploratory analyses on psychological underpinnings of intergroup cooperation revealed that a reputation manipulation (i.e., group membership knowledge manipulation) increased cooperation via increased expected cooperation from an immediate partner regardless of their group membership when the cue of reputational consequences was present. Yet, when the immediate partner was an in-group member, this indirect effect was observed when the cue of reputational consequences was absent. Overall, our findings underscore a new general principle of indirect reciprocity: the cue of reputational consequences determines the perceived realm of indirect reciprocity and influences whether or not individuals condition their cooperation to the group membership of immediate interaction partners.