Color Comparisons and Interpersonal Variation.
Color Comparisons and Interpersonal Variation.
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DOI：
10.1007/s13164-016-0323-2
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发表时间：
2017
影响因子：
2
通讯作者：
Hansen N
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Hansen N
颜色客观主义者认为，关于颜色的陈述是由客观（不涉及主体的）事实决定的，他们面临的一个重要挑战是来自人际差异的论点，即正常观察者在哪里找到独特的色调。最近，一个有吸引力的客观主义回应的论点已经提出，借鉴了语义学的分级形容词，这并不需要捍卫的想法，有一个单一的正确位置为每一个独特的色调（戈麦斯-托伦特诺伊斯50（1）：3-40）。在（汉森）中，我认为最近的客观主义反应并不适用于颜色形容词的比较性出现，因此，从人际变异的角度对这一论点进行了修订，比较性版本仍然是对某些类型的客观主义的有力反驳。在本文中，我解决了几个令人不满意的客观主义者的答复比较版本的论点从人际变异，并提供了我认为是一个更合理的客观主义者的答复比较论点从人际变异。
An important challenge to color objectivists, who hold that statements concerning color are made true or false by objective (non-subject-involving) facts, is the argument from interpersonal variation in where normal observers locate the unique hues. Recently, an attractive objectivist response to the argument has been proposed that draws on the semantics of gradable adjectives and which does not require defending the idea that there is a single correct location for each of the unique hues (Gómez-Torrente Noûs 50(1): 3–40),. In (Hansen), I argued that the recent objectivist response doesn’t apply to comparative occurrences of color adjectives, so a revised, comparative, version of the argument from interpersonal variation remains a powerful objection to certain types of objectivism. In this paper, I address several unsatisfactory objectivist replies to the comparative version of the argument from interpersonal variation, and offer what I think is a more plausible objectivist reply to the comparative argument from interpersonal variation.