The Use of Animal Models in Behavioural Neuroscience Research
The Use of Animal Models in Behavioural Neuroscience Research
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DOI：
10.1007/7854_2014_329
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发表时间：
2015-01-01
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Kaldewaij, Frederike
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Bovenkerk, Bernice;Kaldewaij, Frederike
动物模型用于行为神经科学的实验，旨在为预防和治疗人类的认知和情感障碍（如焦虑和抑郁）做出贡献。具有讽刺意味的是，那些可能成为精神病理学最佳模型的动物，也可能被认为是在道德上最有问题的动物，如果看起来很可能（如果它们最初被选为模型是因为）它们的经历与人类的经历相似，我们有充分的理由避免引起这些经历，并且确实旨在减轻（如疼痛、焦虑或悲伤）。在本文中，在当代动物伦理学和动物心智哲学讨论的背景下，我们讨论了在道德上允许在这类实验中使用动物的观点，以及使用认知不太复杂的动物（如斑马鱼）比使用更复杂的动物（如狗）更好。首先，我们对人类和更复杂的动物具有更高道德地位的说法的一些理由进行了批评。我们认为，将平等的道德地位赋予所有能够有意识努力的生物（例如，避免痛苦和焦虑；以吃和玩为目标）的当代方法是基于更合理的假设。其次，我们认为，假设认知复杂性较低的动物比更复杂的生物拥有更少的感官和情感体验是有问题的。在特定情况下，可能有很好的理由假设，更复杂的生物会受到特定的物理或环境干预的更多伤害，但也可能是，它们有时受到的伤害更小，因为它们有更好的应对能力。因此，确定一个特定的实验是否合理是一个复杂的问题。在本章中，我们的目的是激发对精神病理学使用动物模型背后的这些共同假设的进一步反思。为了能够得出更明确的结论，必须对认知复杂性对（人类和非人类）动物经验的影响进行更多的研究。
Animal models are used in experiments in the behavioural neurosciences that aim to contribute to the prevention and treatment of cognitive and affective disorders in human beings, such as anxiety and depression. Ironically, those animals that are likely to be the best models for psychopathology are also likely to be considered the ones that are most morally problematic to use, if it seems probable that (and if indeed they are initially selected as models because) they have experiences that are similar to human experiences that we have strong reasons to avoid causing, and indeed aim to alleviate (such as pain, anxiety or sadness). In this paper, against the background of contemporary discussions in animal ethics and the philosophy of animal minds, we discuss the views that it is morally permissible to use animals in these kinds of experiments, and that it is better to use less cognitively complex animals (such as zebrafish) than more complex animals (such as dogs). First, we criticise some justifications for the claim that human beings and more complex animals have higher moral status. We argue that contemporary approaches that attribute equal moral status to all beings that are capable of conscious strivings (e.g. avoiding pain and anxiety; aiming to eat and play) are based on more plausible assumptions. Second, we argue that it is problematic to assume that less cognitively complex animals have a lesser sensory and emotional experience than more complex beings across the board. In specific cases, there might be good reasons to assume that more complex beings would be harmed more by a specific physical or environmental intervention, but it might also be that they sometimes are harmed less because of a better ability to cope. Determining whether a specific experiment is justified is therefore a complex issue. Our aim in this chapter is to stimulate further reflection on these common assumptions behind the use of animal models for psychopathologies. In order to be able to draw more definite conclusions, more research will have to be done on the influence of cognitive complexity on the experience of (human and non-human) animals.