Choice of Treatment Intensities by a Nonprofit Hospital under Prospective Pricing
Choice of Treatment Intensities by a Nonprofit Hospital under Prospective Pricing
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前瞻性定价下非营利医院治疗强度的选择
DOI：
10.1111/j.1430-9134.1994.00007.x
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发表时间：
1994
影响因子：
1.9
通讯作者：
W. Rogerson
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
W. Rogerson
在预期定价下，医疗保健的支付者基本上使用医院的价格管制作为间接调节治疗强度的一种方式。本文提出了一种非营利医院在支付者选择价格的情况下如何选择其产品的治疗强度的理论，并根据该理论确定了支付者应如何选择价格。主要的结果是，在均衡状态下，价格与边际成本的比率将在不同产品之间变化，与需求对治疗强度的弹性成反比。这意味着，一般来说，医院将赚取正（负）会计利润的产品与低（高）强度的需求弹性。
Under prospective pricing, payers for health care essentially use price regulation of hospitals as a way of indirectly regulating the provision of treatment intensity. This paper ppresents a theory of how a nonprofit hospital selects treatment intensities for its priducts given the payer's choice of prices and then determines how the payer should select prices in light of this theory. The main result is that, in quilibrium, the ration of price to marginal cost will vary across products inversely with the elasticity of demand with respect to treatment intensity. This means that, generally, the hospital will earn positive(negative) accounting profit on products with low(high) intensity elasticities of demand.
是否应该允许医生为患者“平衡账单”？
影响因子：
3.5
作者：
Glazer,J;McGuire,TG
通讯作者：
McGuire,TG