Why do Authoritarian Regimes Provide Public Goods? Policy Communities, External Shocks and Ideas in China's Rural Social Policy Making
Why do Authoritarian Regimes Provide Public Goods? Policy Communities, External Shocks and Ideas in China's Rural Social Policy Making
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为什么威权政权提供公共产品？
DOI：
10.1080/09668136.2016.1274379
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发表时间：
2017
影响因子：
1.4
通讯作者：
Duckett J
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Duckett J
最近对威权政权的研究认为，他们提供公共产品是为了防止叛乱。本文认为，仅凭“叛乱威胁”并不能解释中国党和国家在21世纪头十年将公共产品扩展到农村居民的政策。借鉴政策制定理论，文章认为，中国的一党专政是在官员、研究人员、国际组织和其他行为者的政策共同体产生的思想和政策选择的影响下，将公共产品扩展到农村人口的。当这些想法和政策选择为应对外部冲击提供解决办法并支持经济发展目标时，党和国家中心采纳并执行了这些想法和政策选择。对威权政治制度中的政策及其结果的解释不仅需要包括“独裁者”，还需要包括其他行为者，以及他们产生的想法。
Recent research on authoritarian regimes argues that they provide public goods in order to prevent rebellion. This essay shows that the ‘threat of rebellion’ alone cannot explain Chinese party-state policies to extend public goods to rural residents in the first decade of the twenty-first century. Drawing on theories of policy making, it argues that China’s one-party regime extended public goods to the rural population under the influence of ideas and policy options generated by policy communities of officials, researchers, international organisations and other actors. The party-state centre adopted and implemented these ideas and policy options when they provided solutions to external shocks and supported economic development goals. Explanations of policies and their outcomes in authoritarian political systems need to include not only ‘dictators’ but also other actors, and the ideas they generate.