The Structures of the Life World
The Structures of the Life World
复制标题
生命世界的结构
作者：
A. Schutz
以下的考虑涉及胡塞尔所谓的“生活世界”（Lebenswelt）的结构，在这个结构中，我们，作为同胞中的人类，以自然的态度，体验文化和社会，对他们的对象采取立场，受到它们的影响并对它们采取行动。在这种态度下，生活世界的存在及其内容的典型性被认为是毫无疑问的，直到进一步注意为止。正如胡塞尔所表明的，我们的思维处于“等等”和“我可以再做一次”的理想之中。**第一种会导致这样一种假设，即迄今为止在我们的经验中证明有效的东西在未来仍将有效；后者与我的期望有关，即迄今为止我通过行动在这个世界上所取得的成就，在未来我也将能够一次又一次地取得。因此，我们可以说，作为生活世界中自然态度的特征的一些基本假设，这些假设本身无疑是公认的。即世界结构的恒常性假设，我们对世界经验的有效性的恒常性假设，以及我们对世界和世界内部的行动能力的恒常性假设。
The following considerations concern the structure of what Husserl calls the “life-world” (Lebenswelt) in which, in the natural attitude, we, as human beings among fellow-beings, experience culture and society, take a stand with regard to their objects, are influenced by them and act upon them. In this attitude the existence of the life-world and the typicality of its contents are accepted as unquestionably given until further notice. As Husserl has shown, our thinking stands under the idealities of the “and so forth” and “I can do it again.” ** The first leads to the assumption that what has proved valid thus far in our experience will remain valid in the future; the latter to the expectancy that what thus far I have been able to accomplish in the world by acting upon it I shall be able to accomplish again and again in the future. Therefore we can speak of fundamental assumptions characteristic of the natural attitude in the life-world, which themselves are accepted as unquestionably given; namely the assumptions of the constancy of the structure of the world, of the constancy of the validity of our experience of the world, and of the constancy of our ability (Vermoglichkeit) to act upon the world and within the world.