Democratic Opposition and Democratization Theory
Democratic Opposition and Democratization Theory
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民主反对派与民主化理论
作者：
A. Stepan
大约四分之一个世纪过去了，政治上的“第三次民主浪潮”开始，民主反对派在民主化进程和新民主治理中的作用有哪些最重要的影响？一个理论主体关注“契约过渡”，另一个理论主体关注“公民社会对国家”的对立作用。这两个理论体系，以及它们所涉及的经验证据，都与重要的过程有关;但在我看来，它们需要进行实质性的修正，然后才能被纳入我们建立民主反对派理论的新努力中。这些修正主义的任务将构成本文的主要努力。然而，还有两个问题尚未得到广泛的记录或理论化。这些问题涉及到民主过渡之后，民主反对派如何通过将重要的“非问题”转化为问题，并通过建立新的参与、透明度和最终问责制结构，帮助巩固和深化民主。我将在开始时简要地讨论这些尚未理论化的领域，以此结束我的文章。在一些研究最多的民主转型国家（西班牙、巴西、乌拉圭、波兰和匈牙利），所有国家都出现了大致类似的模式。在非民主政权经历了内部分裂和日益增长的反对之后，非民主政权的软派与温和的民主反对派举行了重要的非正式讨论。随着时间的推移，出现了一个“游戏”，在这个游戏中，政权温和派和反对派温和派都“使用”（并试图“限制”）自己的权力。
ABOUT A QUARTER OF A CENTURY PAST THE BEGINNING OF THE ‘third democratic wave’ in politics, what are some of the most important implications to be drawn about the role of the democratic opposition in the processes of democratization, and in new democratic governance? One body of theory concerns ‘pacted transitions’, and another the oppositional role of ‘civil society against the state’. Both bodies of theory, and the empirical evidence brought to bear in them, relate to important processes; but in my view they are in need of substantial revision before they can be incorporated into our new efforts to build a democratic theory of opposition. These revisionist tasks will constitute the main effort of this essay.’ However, there are two other concerns which have not yet been extensively documented or theorized. These relate to how, after a democratic transition, the democratic opposition can help consolidate and deepen democracy by turning vital ‘non-issues’ into issues, and by creating new structures of participation, transparency and ultimately of accountability. I will conclude my essay with a brief effort at beginning to address these as yet under-theorized areas. In a number of the most studied transitions to democracy (Spain, Brazil, Uruguay, Poland and Hungary), a roughly similar pattern emerged in all countries. After the non-democratic regime experienced a combination of internal divisions and growing opposition, softliners from the non-democratic regime held important informal discussions with the moderate democratic opposition. Over time, a ‘game’ emerged in which the regime moderates and the opposition moderates both ‘used’ (and attempted to ‘constrain’) their own