Public-Private Sector Interest Coordination in Japan's ODA

Public-Private Sector Interest Coordination in Japan's ODA
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日本官方发展援助中的公私部门利益协调

DOI:
10.2307/2759416
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发表时间:
1994
期刊:
影响因子:
1.6
通讯作者:
D. Arase
D. Arase
中科院分区:
法学4区
文献类型:
--
作者:
D. Arase

文献摘要

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日本官方发展援助(ODA)的政策分析是从官僚政治的模式、对安全环境变化的反应、2或对美国压力的反应3等方面进行的。虽然这些努力集中在有趣而重要的关系上,但它们却将日本官方发展援助中复杂而困难的政府与企业关系问题留在了理论空白中。4这是可以理解的,因为这些努力将官方发展援助作为一个传统的外交政策领域,这种做法自然突出了日本在制定官方发展援助政策时的外部政治和安全动机。这里无意否定这种外交政策方针,但它可能导致以下错误的评估:“目前的一些援助方案中仍然存在商业因素,但这种例子现在是例外而不是规则。“5实际上,日本官方发展援助政策制定中的国内结构至少与纯粹的外交利益一样包含经济和商业利益,本文将提请注意这一点。注意到私营部门在日本官方发展援助中的作用的西方人把注意力集中在附带条件的援助上,认为这是吸收私营部门的手段。例如,像美国这样的捐助国采取援助附带条件的做法,
JN RECENT WORK on Japan's official development assistance (ODA), pollicy has been analyzed in terms of models of bureaucratic politics,' responses to a changing security environment,2 or responses to U.S. pressure.3 While these efforts have focused on interesting and important relationships, they have left the complex and difficult issue of governmentbusiness relations in Japan's ODA in a theoretical lacuna. Recent edited volumes on Japan's ODA suffer from the same tendency.4 This is understandable insofar as these efforts treated ODA as a traditional foreign policy area, and this approach naturally brings to the fore Japan's external political and security motivations in the formulation of ODA policy. There is no intention here to repudiate this foreign policy approach, but it can lead to mistaken assessments such as the following: "[T] here is still a commercial element in some current aid programs, but such examples are now the exception rather than the rule."5 In fact, domestic structures in Japanese ODA policy making incorporate economic and commercial interests at least as much as purely diplomatic interests, and this article will draw attention to this point. Westerners who have noted the private sector role in Japanese ODA have focused on tied aid as the means of private sector inclusion.6 Tied aid is but one of a number of ways economic and commercial motivations can intrude into ODA policy, and it alone is not a reliable indicator of whether policy is strongly determined by commercial and economic interests. For example, donors such as the U.S. resort to aid tying, but this does