The political economy of fiscal deficits and government production
The political economy of fiscal deficits and government production
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财政赤字和政府生产的政治经济学
DOI：
10.1016/j.euroecorev.2012.12.001
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发表时间：
2013
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
G. Natvik
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
G. Natvik
本文研究了政府应该提供哪些商品的分歧如何影响公共部门的资源配置。在职者将预定的资本和劳动力结合在一起，在当期生产不同的产品，并为未来的生产积累物质资本和金融资本。资本-劳动互补性决定了预期的政治更替如何影响政府在物质资本或金融资产储蓄之间的选择。周转往往使用于公共生产的物质资本存量过低，与劳动力的结合效率低下。政治更替的主要代价是公共部门生产效率低下，而不是储蓄水平不够理想。
This paper studies how disagreement over which goods government should provide affects resource allocation in the public sector. An incumbent combines pre-determined capital with labor to produce different goods in the current period, and accumulates physical and financial capital for future production. Capital-labor complementarity determines how anticipated political turnover shapes governments' choice between saving in physical capital or financial assets. Turnover tends to render the stock of physical capital for public production too low and inefficiently combined with labor. The main cost of political turnover is production inefficiency in the public sector, not a suboptimal savings level.