Dynamic Spectrum Leasing and Service Selection in Spectrum Secondary Market of Cognitive Radio Networks

Dynamic Spectrum Leasing and Service Selection in Spectrum Secondary Market of Cognitive Radio Networks
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DOI:
10.1109/twc.2012.010312.110732
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发表时间:
2012-01
影响因子:
10.4
通讯作者:
K. Zhu;D. Niyato;Ping Wang;Zhu Han
K. Zhu;D. Niyato;Ping Wang;Zhu Han
中科院分区:
计算机科学1区
文献类型:
--
作者:
K. Zhu;D. Niyato;Ping Wang;Zhu Han

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我们考虑了认知无线电网络的频谱二级市场中的动态频谱租赁问题,二级服务提供商从频谱经纪人租赁频谱,为二级用户提供服务。当二级供应商和二级用户的最优决策是动态竞争下的问题是具有挑战性的。为了解决这个问题,本文开发了一个两级动态博弈框架。由于次级用户可以根据所接收的服务质量和价格来调整服务选择策略,因此动态服务选择被建模为低层的进化博弈。复制动力学模型的服务选择适应和进化均衡被认为是解决方案。通过动态服务选择,竞争的次级提供商可以动态地租用频谱以向次级用户提供服务。频谱租赁微分对策制定模型在上层的竞争。同时播放模型和异步播放模型。底层进化博弈的服务选择分布描述了上微分博弈的状态。开环和闭环纳什均衡作为微分对策的动态控制的解决方案。数值比较表明,该方法在收益和收敛速度方面优于静态控制。
We consider a problem of dynamic spectrum leasing in a spectrum secondary market of cognitive radio networks where secondary service providers lease spectrum from spectrum brokers to provide service to secondary users. The problem is challenging when the optimal decisions of both secondary providers and secondary users are made dynamically under competition. To address this problem, a two-level dynamic game framework is developed in this paper. Since the secondary users can adapt the service selection strategies according to the received service quality and price, the dynamic service selection is modeled as an evolutionary game at the lower level. The replicator dynamics is applied to model the service selection adaptation and the evolutionary equilibrium is considered to be the solution. With dynamic service selection, competitive secondary providers can dynamically lease spectrum to provide service to secondary users. A spectrum leasing differential game is formulated to model this competition at the upper level. Both simultaneous play model and asynchronous play model are considered. The service selection distribution of the underlying evolutionary game describes the state of the upper differential game. Both open-loop and closed-loop Nash equilibria are obtained as the solution of dynamic control of the differential game. Numerical comparison shows the advantages over static control in terms of profit and convergence speed.