Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi-demand preferences
Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi-demand preferences
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DOI：
10.1007/s00355-016-0986-8
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发表时间：
2015-08
影响因子：
0.9
通讯作者：
Tomoya Kazumura;Shigehiro Serizawa
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Tomoya Kazumura;Shigehiro Serizawa
我们考虑的问题分配的对象集代理和收取款项。每个代理都有一个偏好关系的一组对组成的一组对象和支付。偏好不一定是准线性的。非准线性偏好描述了财富效应不可忽略的环境：支付水平改变了代理人为交换集支付的意愿。我们研究了有效的防策略规则的存在性。一个偏好关系是unit-demandi，如果给定一个支付水平，对于每一组对象，集合中最偏好的一个至少和集合本身一样好;它是multi-demandi，如果给定一个支付水平，当一个代理人收到一个对象时，收到一些额外的对象使他更好。我们表明，如果一个域包含足够多的单位需求偏好和至少一个多需求偏好关系，如果有更多的代理比对象，那么没有规则满足效率，策略的防，个人的理性，和没有补贴的损失域。
We consider the problem of allocating sets of objects to agents and collecting payments. Each agent has a preference relation over the set of pairs consisting of a set of objects and a payment. Preferences are not necessarily quasi-linear. Non-quasi-linear preferences describe environments where the wealth effect is non-negligible: the payment level changes agents’ willingness to pay for swapping sets. We investigate the existence ofefficientandstrategy-proofrules. A preference relation isunit-demandif given a payment level, for each set of objects, the most preferred one in the set is at least as good as the set itself; it ismulti-demandif given a payment level, when an agent receives an object, receiving some additional object(s) makes him better off. We show that if a domain contains enough variety of unit-demand preferences and at least one multi-demand preference relation, and if there are more agents than objects, then no rule satisfiesefficiency,strategy-proofness,individual rationality, andno subsidy for loserson the domain.