Detecting and avoiding wormhole attacks in wireless ad hoc networks
Detecting and avoiding wormhole attacks in wireless ad hoc networks
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DOI：
10.1109/mcom.2008.4481351
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发表时间：
2008-04
影响因子：
11.2
通讯作者：
Farid Naït-Abdesselam;B. Bensaou;T. Taleb
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Farid Naït-Abdesselam;B. Bensaou;T. Taleb
对自组织网络中路由协议的一种特别严重的攻击是所谓的虫洞攻击，其中两个或多个共谋的攻击者在一个位置记录数据包，并将它们通过隧道传输到另一个位置，以便在该远程位置重放。当此攻击专门针对路由控制数据包时，靠近攻击者的节点将免受任何到远程位置的一跳或两跳以上的替代路由的影响。因此，所有路由都指向攻击者建立的虫洞。在优化的链路状态路由协议中，如果在链路状态数据包传播过程中发起虫洞攻击，错误的链路信息会渗透到整个网络，导致路由中断。在本文中，我们设计了一种有效的方法来检测和避免 OLSR 协议中的虫洞攻击。该方法首先尝试查明可能是虫洞隧道一部分的链接。然后，通过在两个假设的邻居（虫洞端点）之间交换加密的探测数据包，将适当的虫洞检测机制应用于可疑链接。所提出的解决方案具有多种优点，其中包括不依赖任何时间同步或位置信息，以及在各种场景下的高检测率。
A particularly severe attack on routing protocols in ad hoc networks is the so-called worm- hole attack in which two or more colluding attackers record packets at one location, and tunnel them to another location for replay at that remote location. When this attack targets specifically routing control packets, the nodes that are close to the attackers are shielded from any alternative routes with more than one or two hops to the remote location. All routes are thus directed to the wormhole established by the attackers. In the optimized link state routing protocol, if a wormhole attack is launched during the propagation of link state packets, the wrong link information percolates throughout the network, leading to routing disruption. In this article we devise an efficient method to detect and avoid wormhole attacks in the OLSR protocOLSR protocolol. This method first attempts to pinpoint links that may potentially be part of a wormhole tunnel. Then a proper wormhole detection mechanism is applied to suspicious links by means of an exchange of encrypted probing packets between the two supposed neighbors (endpoints of the wormhole). The proposed solution exhibits several advantages, among which are its nonreliance on any time synchronization or location information, and its high detection rate under various scenarios.