Gender and free riding in a threshold public goods game: Experimental evidence
Gender and free riding in a threshold public goods game: Experimental evidence
复制标题
DOI：
10.1016/s0167-2681(97)00010-3
复制
发表时间：
1998-03-15
影响因子：
2.2
通讯作者：
Maynes, E
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Cadsby, CB;Maynes, E
本文在一个允许搭便车和合作门槛均衡的门槛公共产品框架中，通过实验检验了性别对贡献的影响。受试者是从随机选择的学生样本中招募的，最初女性的贡献明显高于男性，但随着游戏的发展，重要性消失了。然而，女性群体能够更好地围绕选定的平衡进行协调。这种协调并不意味着在避免浪费捐款方面有更高的效率。这似乎确实与女性在整个游戏中表现得更相似的倾向有关。将结果与连续拨备框架进行了比较。(C)1998年爱思唯尔科学公司。
This paper examines experimentally the effect of gender on contributions in a threshold public good framework which permits both strong free-riding and cooperative threshold equilibria. Subjects are recruited from a randomly selected sample of students, Females initially contribute significantly more than males, but significance vanishes as the game evolves. However, female groups are significantly better able to coordinate around a selected equilibrium. Such coordination does not imply greater efficiency at avoiding wasteful contributions. It does seem related to a tendency of females to behave more like each other throughout the game. Results are compared with the continuous provision framework. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science B.V.