Proof-theoretical Semantics and Fregean Identity-criteria for Propositions
Proof-theoretical Semantics and Fregean Identity-criteria for Propositions
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命题的证明理论语义和弗雷格恒等准则
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发表时间：
1994
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通讯作者：
G. Sundholm
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作者：
G. Sundholm
弗雷格在他的《语法学基础》第32节中提出了这样一个观点，即一个句子的意义是由它的真值条件给出的，或者，在他的特殊版本中，是由它将成为真值的名称的条件给出的。事实上，这只是真理在弗雷琴体系中扮演的众多角色之一。特别是，真理是一个绝对的概念，在这个意义上，二价成立：每一个格丹克（命题）要么是真的，要么是假的，完全独立于任何意动活动，无论是上帝还是人。因此，各种认识论概念，如所作断言的正确性，或所通过的判断，都可以还原为这种绝对的真理概念：当陈述句所表达的命题为真时，通过陈述句的表达（公开）作出的断言（判断）是正确的。鉴于真理的这种绝对地位，弗雷格认为真理是一个自成一类的概念，不应加以分析，而且事实上是不可定义的，这就不足为奇了。其他人，特别是布伦塔诺、罗素，尤其是《逻辑哲学论》的作者，沿着真理创造者的模式，对真理进行了理想的分析：
In his Grundgesetze, §32, Frege launched the idea that the meaning of a sentence is given by its truth condition, or, in his particular version, the condition under which it will be a name of the True. This, indeed, was only one of the many roles in which truth has to serve within the Fregean system. In particular, truth is an absolute notion in the sense that bivalence holds: every Gedanke (proposition) is either true or false, in complete independence of any conative activity, whether by God or man. Thus various epistemological notions, such as the correctness of an assertion made, or judgement passed, are reducible to this absolute notion of truth: an assertion (judgement) made (public) through the utterance of a declarative sentence is correct when the proposition expressed by the sentence in question is true. Given this absolute status of truth it is not surprising that Frege is of the opinion that truth is a sui generis notion which has to be left unanalyzed and, indeed, which is indefinable. It was left to others, in particular Brentano, Russell, and above all, the author of the Tractatus, to provide the desired analysis of truth along the pattern of the truth-maker scheme: