A Defense of Conditional Excluded Middle
A Defense of Conditional Excluded Middle
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有条件排除中间的辩护
DOI：
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发表时间：
1980
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影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Robert Stalnaker
中科院分区：
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作者：
Robert Stalnaker
本文是关于条件句语义中的一个细节的争论。它认为大卫刘易斯、1约翰·波洛克、2布赖恩·切拉斯、3以及我和里士满·梅森4提出的语义理论的共同之处是理所当然的，目的是把重点放在我所支持的理论与其他理论之间的一些细微差异上。我将快速而粗略地勾勒出所有这些理论背后的一般思想，以及这些思想发展的共同语义框架。然后，我将描述我的理论与其他理论之间的分歧--我将重点讨论我的理论与刘易斯支持的理论之间的差异--并论证我的理论更好地解释了条件句在自然语言中的工作方式。
This paper is a polemic about a detail in the semantics for conditionals. It takes for granted what is common to semantic theories proposed by David Lewis,1 John Pollock,2 Brian Chellas,3 and myself and Richmond Thomason4 in order to focus on some small points of difference between the theory I favor and the others. I will sketch quickly and roughly the general ideas which lie behind all of these theories, and the common semantical framework in which these ideas are developed. Then I will describe the divergences between my theory and the others — I will focus on the difference between my theory and the one favored by Lewis — and argue that my theory gives a better account of the way conditionals work in natural language.