Learning in monopolies with delayed feedback on price expectations
Learning in monopolies with delayed feedback on price expectations
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通过对价格预期的延迟反馈来学习垄断
DOI:
10.1016/j.cnsns.2015.04.011
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发表时间:
2015
影响因子:
3.9
通讯作者:
Ferenc Szidarovszky
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
Akio Matsumoto;Ferenc Szidarovszky
We call the intercept of the price function with the vertical axis themaximum priceand the slope of the price function themarginal price. In this paper it is assumed that a monopolistic firm has full information about the marginal price and its own cost function but is uncertain on the maximum price. However, by repeated interaction with the market, the obtained price observations give a basis for an adaptive learning process of the maximum price. It is also assumed that the price observations have fixed delays, so the learning process can be described by a delayed differential equation. In the cases of one or two delays, the asymptotic behavior of the resulting dynamic process is examined, stability conditions are derived. Three main results are demonstrated in the two delay learning processes. First, it is possible to stabilize the equilibrium which is unstable in the one delay model. Second, complex dynamics involving chaos, which is impossible in the one delay model, can emerge. Third, alternations of stability and instability (i.e., stability switches) occur repeatedly.