Market Concentration, Privatization Policies, and Heterogeneity among Private Firms in Mixed Oligopolies
Market Concentration, Privatization Policies, and Heterogeneity among Private Firms in Mixed Oligopolies
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发表时间：
2021
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通讯作者：
Junichi Haraguchi;Toshihiro Matsumura
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作者：
Junichi Haraguchi;Toshihiro Matsumura
混合寡头垄断的特点是私营企业和公营企业并存。关于混合寡头垄断的文献表明，假设所有私人公司都是相同的，私有化的最优程度随着私人公司的数量而增加。换句话说，市场越集中，政府就越应该将公共机构私有化。我们通过引入私人公司之间的成本异质性来重新审视这个问题。我们表明，在边际成本不变的假设下，一个新的进入私人公司将不会降低最佳程度的私有化，无论私营公司之间的成本差异。然而，在边际成本递增的假设下，我们表明，当新进入者的效率明显低于现有的私人公司时，新进入者将降低最优的私有化程度。我们的研究结果意味着，竞争和私有化政策之间的关系比文献所表明的要复杂得多，它们取决于私营企业的成本结构。
Mixed oligopolies are characterized by the coexistence of private and public enterprises. The literature on mixed oligopolies indicates that, assuming all private firms are identical, the optimal degree of privatization increases with the number of private firms. In other words, the more concentrated the market is, the more the government should privatize public firms. We revisit this problem by introducing cost-heterogeneity among private firms. We show that under the assumption of constant marginal costs, a new entry by a private firm will not reduce the optimal degree of privatization, regardless of the cost differences among private firms. However, under the assumption of increasing marginal costs, we show that a new entry will reduce the optimal degree of privatization when the new entrant is significantly less efficient than the private firms already present. Our results imply that the relationship between competition and privatization polices are more complicated than the literature suggests, and they depend on the cost structure of private firms.