Evolution of public cooperation in a monitored society with implicated punishment and within-group enforcement.
Evolution of public cooperation in a monitored society with implicated punishment and within-group enforcement.
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受监控社会中公共合作的演变，涉及惩罚和群体内执行
DOI：
10.1038/srep17050
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发表时间：
2015-11-24
影响因子：
4.6
通讯作者：
Perc M
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Chen X;Sasaki T;Perc M
在人类社会中，用牵连惩罚进行监督是很常见的，以避免搭公共物品的便车。但它在促进公众合作方面是否有效？我们证明了监督和牵连惩罚的引入确实是有效的，因为它将公共产品博弈转变为协调博弈，从而使合作在无限和有限混合良好的群体中可行。我们还表明，群体内执法的加入进一步促进了公共合作的演变。然而，尽管在这种情况下群体规模对集体行为具有非线性影响，但中间群体规模对合作行为的影响最小。这与最近的实地观察相矛盾，在那里，一个中间群体规模被宣布为最佳，并推测群体规模效应和群体内部执行是负责任的。因此，我们的理论研究阐明了人类社会中带有牵连惩罚的监测的关键方面，此外，它揭示了促进亲社会集体行动的基本群体规模效应。
Monitoring with implicated punishment is common in human societies to avert freeriding on common goods. But is it effective in promoting public cooperation? We show that the introduction of monitoring and implicated punishment is indeed effective, as it transforms the public goods game to a coordination game, thus rendering cooperation viable in infinite and finite well-mixed populations. We also show that the addition of within-group enforcement further promotes the evolution of public cooperation. However, although the group size in this context has nonlinear effects on collective action, an intermediate group size is least conductive to cooperative behaviour. This contradicts recent field observations, where an intermediate group size was declared optimal with the conjecture that group-size effects and within-group enforcement are responsible. Our theoretical research thus clarifies key aspects of monitoring with implicated punishment in human societies and additionally, it reveals fundamental group-size effects that facilitate prosocial collective action.