Fifteen Arguments Against Hypothetical Frequentism
Fifteen Arguments Against Hypothetical Frequentism
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反对假想频率论的十五个论据
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发表时间：
2009
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通讯作者：
A. Hájek
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作者：
A. Hájek
摘要这是我的“反对有限频率论的十五个论点”（Erkenntnis 1997）的续集，这是一篇攻击概率论频率论的两种主要形式的长论文的后半部分。假设频率论断言：属性 A 在参考类 B 中的概率是 piff，如果存在无限序列 B，则 A 在 B 中的相对频率的极限将为 p。
我提出十五个反对这一分析的论据。我考虑了各种常客主义的反应，我认为这些反应最终都会失败。最后，我提出了我自己的积极建议，即“超假设频率论”，我认为它避免了假设频率论的几个问题。它通过超有限试验序列中的相对频率来识别概率。然而，我认为这种说法也失败了，频率主义的前景很暗淡。
AbstractThis is the sequel to my “Fifteen Arguments Against Finite Frequentism” (Erkenntnis 1997), the second half of a long paper that attacks the two main forms of frequentism about probability. Hypothetical frequentism asserts:The probability of an attribute A in a reference class B is piffthe limit of the relative frequency of A’s among the B’s would be p if there were an infinite sequence of B’s.
I offer fifteen arguments against this analysis. I consider various frequentist responses, which I argue ultimately fail. I end with a positive proposal of my own, ‘hyper-hypothetical frequentism’, which I argue avoids several of the problems with hypothetical frequentism. It identifies probability with relative frequency in a hyperfinite sequence of trials. However, I argue that this account also fails, and that the prospects for frequentism are dim.