To See is to Believe: Common Expectations in Experimental Asset Markets
To See is to Believe: Common Expectations in Experimental Asset Markets
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眼见为实：实验资产市场的共同期望
DOI：
10.1016/j.euroecorev.2013.11.009
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发表时间：
2014
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Stefan Palan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
S. Cheung;M. Hedegaard;Stefan Palan
我们在先前的研究发现存在非理性的环境中，即Smith等人（1988）引入的资产市场实验中，通过实验操纵代理人关于他人合理性的信息。最近的研究表明，这种市场中的错误定价可能是混乱的产物，可以通过训练受试者了解逐渐减少的基本价值来减少这种混乱。我们重新考虑了这一观点，并提出，当公众知道培训已经发生时，这也可能减少对他人行为的不确定性，并促进共同期望的形成。我们的设计将培训的直接影响从公共知识的间接影响中分离出来，我们的结果表明，公共知识比单独的培训有明显的、统计上显著的影响。
We experimentally manipulate agents' information regarding the rationality of others in a setting in which previous studies have found irrationality to be present, namely the asset market experiments introduced by Smith et al. (1988). Recent studies suggest that mispricing in such markets may be an artefact of confusion, which can be reduced by training subjects to understand the diminishing fundamental value. We reconsider this view, and propose that when it is made public knowledge that training has occurred, this may also reduce uncertainty over the behavior of others and facilitate the formation of common expectations. Our design disentangles the direct effect of training from the indirect effect of its public knowledge, and our results demonstrate a distinct and statistically significant effect of public knowledge over and above that of training alone.
影响因子：
8.4
作者：
Frederick, S
通讯作者：
Frederick, S