Be Adaptive, Avoid Overcommitting
Be Adaptive, Avoid Overcommitting
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适应,避免过度投入
DOI:
10.1007/978-3-319-63688-7_5
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发表时间:
2017
期刊:
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Daniel Wichs
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
Zahra Jafargholi;Chethan Kamath;Karen Klein;Ilan Komargodski;Krzysztof Pietrzak;Daniel Wichs
For many cryptographic primitives, it is relatively easy to achieve selective security (where the adversary commits a-priori to some of the choices to be made later in the attack) but appears difficult to achieve the more natural notion of adaptive security (where the adversary can make all choices on the go as the attack progresses). A series of several recent works shows how to cleverly achieve adaptive security in several such scenarios including generalized selective decryption (Panjwani, TCC ’07 and Fuchsbauer et al., CRYPTO ’15), constrained PRFs (Fuchsbauer et al., ASIACRYPT ’14), and Yao garbled circuits (Jafargholi and Wichs, TCC ’16b). Although the above works expressed vague intuition that they share a common technique, the connection was never made precise. In this work we present a new framework that connects all of these works and allows us to present them in a unified and simplified fashion. Moreover, we use the framework to derive a new result for adaptively secure secret sharing over access structures defined via monotone circuits. We envision that further applications will follow in the future.