Interregional negotiations and strategic delegation under government subsidy schemes
Interregional negotiations and strategic delegation under government subsidy schemes
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政府补贴计划下的区域间谈判和战略授权
DOI：
10.1111/jpet.12494
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发表时间：
2020
影响因子：
1.1
通讯作者：
Shinohara Ryusuke
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Qing Hu;Tomomichi Mizuno;and Junghyun Song;Shinohara Ryusuke
我们研究了在中央政府补贴政策下的区域间谈判中的战略授权问题。众所周知，当这种谈判被授权给代表时，一个国家的每个地区都有策略地选举自己的代表，导致谈判结果效率低下。本研究的重点是一种常见的补贴政策，称为成本匹配补助，以检查是否存在一个最佳的补助，恢复谈判结果的效率。我们的研究结果表明，如果谈判破裂结果的可操纵性足够弱，中央政府获得这一最优赠款。可操纵性的强度是重要的，因为引入赠款会产生一种新的操纵谈判破裂的结果。然而，当谈判破裂后选出新的代表时，新的可操纵性就被否定了。因此，中央政府总是获得最优的成本匹配补助。
We examine thestrategic delegationproblem in the context of interregional negotiations under the subsidy policies of a central government. It is well known that when such negotiations are delegated to representatives, each region in a country elects its representative strategically, resulting in inefficient negotiation outcomes. This study focuses on a common subsidy policy called acost‐matching grantto examine whether an optimal grant exists that restores the efficiency of negotiation outcomes. Our results show that the central government obtains this optimal grant if the manipulability of the negotiation breakdown outcome is sufficiently weak. The strength of the manipulability is important because introducing a grant generates a new kind of manipulation of negotiation breakdown outcomes. However, when a new representative is elected after a negotiation breaks down, the new manipulability is negated. Hence, the central government always obtains the optimal cost‐matching grant.