Soft budget constraints, transaction and financial systems
Soft budget constraints, transaction and financial systems
复制标题
软预算约束、交易和金融系统
DOI：
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发表时间：
2000
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
G. Roland
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
M. Dewatripont;G. Roland
本文综述了解决“软预算约束问题”的一些贡献，即亏损企业的再融资问题。这个问题在转型经济体中特别普遍，但在市场经济中也很普遍。在Dewatripont和Maskin[1995]之后，本文将软预算约束视为存在沉没成本的动态承诺问题。分析了强化预算约束的各种方式：私有化、去垄断、政府去中心化、信贷去中心化和银行改革。最后，本文探讨了预算约束在风险承担和创新中的作用。
This paper surveys a number of contributions that deal with the "soft budget constraint problem," that is, the refinancing of loss-making enterprises. This problem is particularly prevalent in transition economies but is also pervasive in market economies. Following DEWATRIPONT AND MASKIN [1995], the paper looks at soft budget constraints as dynamic commitment problems in the presence of sunk costs. Various ways to harden budget constraints are analyzed: privatization, demonopolization, decentralization of government, decentralization of credit, and banking reform. Finally, the paper looks at the role of budget constraints on risk taking and innovation.