Conservation when landowners have bargaining power: Continuous conservation investments and cost uncertainty
Conservation when landowners have bargaining power: Continuous conservation investments and cost uncertainty
复制标题
土地所有者拥有议价能力时的保护：持续的保护投资和成本不确定性
DOI：
10.1016/j.ecolecon.2013.04.016
复制
发表时间：
2013
影响因子：
7
通讯作者：
Lennox G
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Lennox G
在确定保护投资的优先次序时，应考虑到确保保护协议的空间异质成本。大多数将保护成本纳入分析的研究人员都依赖于对土地所有者接受保护协议的机会成本的估计。因此，这类研究中隐含的假设是，那些“生产”生物多样性的人（土地所有者）没有从贸易中获得任何盈余。相反，土地所有者可以利用他们的议价能力从保护投资中获利。我们采用博弈论，以确定剩余的土地所有者可以获得在保护协议的谈判，以及随之而来的保护结果的影响，当招生决定是由连续变量（例如注册的财产的比例）。此外，我们考虑如何土地所有者的不确定性对其他土地所有者的机会成本影响这些结果。土地业权人获取盈余的能力差异很大，反映出不同物业在达致指定保育目的方面的替代性差异。土地所有者从保护协议中获得利润的能力导致保护结果，相对于土地所有者以机会成本接受投资时，保护结果大大减少。不确定性增加了土地所有者的利润，导致保护效益的进一步减少。
Spatially heterogeneous costs of securing conservation agreements should be accounted for when prioritizing properties for conservation investment. Most researchers incorporating conservation costs into analyses have relied on estimates of landowners' opportunity costs of accepting a conservation agreement. Implicitly assumed in such studies is therefore that those who “produce” biodiversity (landowners) receive none of the surplus available from trade. Instead, landowners could use their bargaining power to gain profits from conservation investments. We employ game theory to determine the surplus landowners could obtain in negotiations over conservation agreements, and the consequent effects on conservation outcomes, when enrolment decisions are governed by continuous variables (e.g. the proportion of a property to enrol). In addition, we consider how landowner uncertainty regarding the opportunity costs of other landowners affects these outcomes. Landowners' ability to gain surplus is highly variable and reflects variation in the substitutability of different properties for achieving a specified conservation objective. The ability of landowners to obtain profits from conservation agreements results in conservation outcomes that are substantially diminished relative to when landowners accept investment at opportunity costs. Uncertainty increases landowner profits, leading to a greater diminution in conservation benefits.