Experience of Asian Asset Management Companies: Do They Increase Moral Hazard? - Evidence from Thailand

Experience of Asian Asset Management Companies: Do They Increase Moral Hazard? - Evidence from Thailand
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亚洲资产管理公司的经验：它们是否增加了道德风险？

DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.694965
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发表时间：
2004
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
G. Pasadilla
G. Pasadilla
中科院分区：
--
文献类型：
--
作者：
Akiko Terada;G. Pasadilla

文献摘要

被引文献

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本文研究了亚洲资产管理公司（AMC）的业绩。分析表明，AMC的设计和性能各不相同。资产管理公司可能引发道德风险引发的银行放贷.对泰国经验的实证研究表明，在公共资产管理公司的情况下，道德风险引发的银行贷款导致了更多新的不良贷款。或者，集中的泰国资产管理公司（TAMC）降低了新的不良贷款率，这表明TAMC不会对金融机构产生不利的道德风险影响。
This paper examines the performances of Asian asset management companies (AMCs). The analysis reveals that AMCs vary in their design and performance. Asset management companies can trigger moral hazard- inspired bank lending. Empirical examination of the Thai experience reveals that the moral hazard-inspired bank lending resulted in creating more new NPLs in the case of public asset management companies. Alternatively, the centralized Thai Asset Management Company (TAMC) decreases the new NPL ratio, suggesting that TAMC provokes no adverse moral hazard effect on financial institutions.