Strategy-proofness in experimental matching markets
Strategy-proofness in experimental matching markets
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DOI：
10.1007/s10683-020-09665-9
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发表时间：
2020-08
影响因子：
2.3
通讯作者：
Pablo Guillén;Róbert F. Veszteg
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Pablo Guillén;Róbert F. Veszteg
我们引入了两种新的匹配机制，反向顶部交易周期（RTTC）和反向延迟接受（RDA），其目的是挑战的想法，即战略防御的理论属性在经济实验中诱导高的真理讲述率。RTTC和RDA分别与著名的顶部交易周期（TTC）和延迟接受（DA）机制在所有理论属性上相同，除了它们的主导策略均衡是以与诱导方式相反的顺序报告偏好。由于焦点说真话策略处于失衡状态，我们能够清楚地测量策略证明机制报告的说真话行为中有多少是与理性行为相容的，有多少是由混乱的决策者在不了解游戏结构的情况下遵循默认焦点策略造成的。在一个学校分配的设置，我们发现，大约一半的观察到的真理告诉TTC和DA是天真（非战略）的行为的结果。在RTTC和RDA中，只有14-31%的参与者选择了与理性行为相容的行为。此外，通过观察那些看似理性的参与者在控制任务中的反应，很明显，大多数人对游戏的动机缺乏基本的理解。我们认为，使用默认选项，混乱和其他行为偏见占绝大多数的真实发挥在TTC和DA在实验室实验。
We introduce two novel matching mechanisms, Reverse Top Trading Cycles (RTTC) and Reverse Deferred Acceptance (RDA), with the purpose of challenging the idea that the theoretical property of strategy-proofness induces high rates of truth-telling in economic experiments. RTTC and RDA are identical to the celebrated Top Trading Cycles (TTC) and Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanisms, respectively, in all their theoretical properties except that their dominant-strategy equilibrium is to report one’s preferences in the order opposite to the way they were induced. With the focal truth-telling strategy being out of equilibrium, we are able to perform a clear measurement of how much of the truth-telling reported for strategy-proof mechanisms is compatible with rational behaviour and how much of it is caused by confused decision-makers following a default, focal strategy without understanding the structure of the game. In a school-allocation setting, we find that roughly half of the observed truth-telling under TTC and DA is the result of naïve (non-strategic) behaviour. Only 14–31% of the participants choose actions in RTTC and RDA that are compatible with rational behaviour. Furthermore, by looking at the responses of those seemingly rational participants in control tasks, it becomes clear that most lack a basic understanding of the incentives of the game. We argue that the use of a default option, confusion and other behavioural biases account for the vast majority of truthful play in both TTC and DA in laboratory experiments.