Interperceptional equilibrium as a generalization of Nash equilibrium in games with interperception
Interperceptional equilibrium as a generalization of Nash equilibrium in games with interperception
复制标题
互知均衡是纳什均衡在互知博弈中的推广
DOI：
10.1109/3468.895886
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发表时间：
2000
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
T. Inohara
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
T. Inohara
我们在具有互知性的游戏中提出了一个解决方案概念，称为互知性平衡。给出了结果达到知觉平衡的两个充分条件。还表明，在某些现实条件下，知觉均衡的概念可以看作是纳什均衡概念的推广。还讨论了本文给出的框架与“软”博弈论和戏剧理论的关系。
We propose a solution concept, called interperceptional equilibrium, in games with interperception. Two sufficient conditions for an outcome to be an interperceptional equilibrium are given. It is also shown that, under some realistic conditions, the concept of interperceptional equilibrium can be regarded as a generalization of the concept of Nash equilibrium. The relations between the framework given in the paper and those of "soft" game theory and drama theory are also discussed.