Independent Regulators: Theory, Evidence and Reform Proposals
Independent Regulators: Theory, Evidence and Reform Proposals
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独立监管机构：理论、证据和改革建议
DOI：
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发表时间：
2010
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Francesc Trillas
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
M. Montoya;Francesc Trillas
有人提议，监管独立是一种机制，可缓解与包括电信在内的网络行业投资的沉没性质有关的承诺问题。本文总结了作者和其他人在这一领域的工作（暂停以评估几年的研究），展示了截至2010年拉丁美洲电信监管实践的新数据，并讨论了监管机构的改革建议。监管独立的制度有成本也有好处;然而，对行业业绩的积极和重大影响在数量上很可能是有限的。根据经验证据和对文献的评估，改革建议旨在提高机构的有效性。
Regulatory independence has been proposed as a mechanism to alleviate the commitment problem associated to the sunk nature of investments in network industries, including telecommunications. This paper summarizes the authors’ and others’ work in this field (in a pause to take stock of several years of research), shows new data on the practice of regulation in Latin American telecommunications until 2010, and discusses reform proposals for regulatory agencies. The institution of regulatory independence has costs as well as benefits; the positive and significant impact on industry performance is however most likely quantitatively modest. As a result of the empirical evidence and the assessment of the literature, the reform proposals are meant to improve the effectiveness of the institution.