The great reversals: the politics of financial development in the twentieth century
The great reversals: the politics of financial development in the twentieth century
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DOI：
10.1016/s0304-405x(03)00125-9
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发表时间：
2003-07-01
影响因子：
8.9
通讯作者：
Zingales, L
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Rajan, RG;Zingales, L
金融部门的发展状况不会随着时间的推移而单调变化。特别是，按照大多数衡量标准，各国在1913年的金融发展程度高于1980年，直到最近才超过1913年的水平。为了解释这些变化，我们提出了一个金融发展的利益集团理论，在位者反对金融发展，因为它滋生竞争。该理论预测，当一个经济体同时允许跨境贸易和资本流动时，在位者的反对情绪会减弱。这一理论可以在一定程度上解释金融发展的跨国差异和时间序列变化。(C)2003 Elsevier Science B.V.保留所有权利。
The state of development of the financial sector does not change monotonically over time. In particular, by most measures, countries were more financially developed in 1913 than in 1980 and only recently have they surpassed their 1913 levels. To explain these changes, we propose an interest group theory of financial development where incumbents oppose financial development because it breeds competition. The theory predicts that incumbents' opposition will be weaker when an economy allows both cross-border trade and capital flows. This theory can go some way in accounting for the cross-country differences in, and the time-series variation of, financial development. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.