Can Contractualism Save Us from Aggregation?
Can Contractualism Save Us from Aggregation?
复制标题
契约主义能把我们从聚合中拯救出来吗？
DOI：
10.1007/s10892-011-9113-3
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发表时间：
2011
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
B. Fried
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
B. Fried
本文探讨了契约主义者的努力，以开发一种替代聚合来管理我们的责任，不伤害（责任救援）他人。我的结论是，文学作品中阐述的许多道德原则似乎都被简化为一个不同名称的集合。那些不这样做的人只有在社会生活边缘的少数古怪案例中才是可行的。如果扩展到普通的行为，解释几乎所有对他人的非故意（在不希望的意义上）伤害-非犯罪活动，对他人造成一定的伤害风险-他们将排除所有的行动。此外，由于这种行为在行动自由和免于预期伤害的自由之间构成了一种不可简化的冲突，因此它只能由这样的原则来调节，即这些原则接受必须精确地做出契约主义从根本上承诺拒绝的那种人际权衡：数字计算的权衡，例如对一个人造成严重伤害的风险可以用对许多人的微小利益来证明。
This paper examines the efforts of contractualists to develop an alternative to aggregation to govern our duty not to harm (duty to rescue) others. I conclude that many of the moral principles articulated in the literature seem to reduce to aggregation by a different name. Those that do not are viable only as long as they are limited to a handful of oddball cases at the margins of social life. If extended to run-of-the-mill conduct that accounts for virtually all unintended (in the sense of undesired) harm to others—noncriminal activities that impose some risk of harm on others—they would rule out all action. Moreover, because such conduct poses an irreducible conflict between freedom of action and freedom from expected harm, it can be regulated only by principles that accept the necessity of making precisely the sorts of interpersonal trade-offs that contractualism is foundationally committed to reject: trade-offs in which the numbers count, such that a risk of serious harm to one person can be justified by small benefits to the many.