Auction-Based Resource Allocation for Cooperative Communications

Auction-Based Resource Allocation for Cooperative Communications
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DOI:
10.1109/jsac.2008.080919
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发表时间:
2008-09
影响因子:
16.4
通讯作者:
Jianwei Huang;Zhu Han;M. Chiang;H. V. Poor
Jianwei Huang;Zhu Han;M. Chiang;H. V. Poor
中科院分区:
计算机科学1区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Jianwei Huang;Zhu Han;M. Chiang;H. V. Poor

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在大规模通信网络中,有效的分布式资源分配是充分实现协作通信效益的关键。本文提出了两种拍卖机制,SNR拍卖和功率拍卖,决定中继选择和中继功率分配在一个分布式的方式。首先考虑单中继网络,纳什均衡的存在性和唯一性(即,拍卖的结果)。结果表明,功率拍卖通过最大化总速率增量实现了有效分配,而信噪比拍卖在公平性和效率之间具有灵活性。对于这两个拍卖,分布式的最佳对策出价更新全局收敛到唯一的纳什均衡在一个完全异步的方式。然后将分析推广到多继电器网络,并在适当的条件下证明了纳什均衡的存在性。仿真结果验证了所提算法的有效性和鲁棒性。
Distributed and efficient resource allocation is critical for fully realizing the benefits of cooperative communications in large scale communication networks. This paper proposes two auction mechanisms, the SNR auction and the power auction, that determine relay selection and relay power allocation in a distributed fashion. A single-relay network is considered first, and the existence and uniqueness of the Nash Equilibrium (i.e., the auction's outcome) are proved. It is shown that the power auction achieves the efficient allocation by maximizing the total rate increase, and the SNR auction is flexible in trading off fairness and efficiency. For both auctions, the distributed best response bid updates globally converge to the unique Nash Equilibrium in a completely asynchronous manner. The analysis is then generalized to networks with multiple relays, and the existence of the Nash Equilibrium is shown under appropriate conditions. Simulation results verify the effectiveness and robustness of the proposed algorithms.