THE EVOLUTION OF RECIPROCITY IN SIZABLE GROUPS
THE EVOLUTION OF RECIPROCITY IN SIZABLE GROUPS
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DOI：
10.1016/s0022-5193(88)80219-4
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发表时间：
1988-06-07
影响因子：
2
通讯作者：
RICHERSON, PJ
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
BOYD, R;RICHERSON, PJ
近年来，一些学者利用重复囚徒困境博弈研究了互惠利他行为的演化。这些模型表明，自然选择很可能有利于行为策略，导致互惠合作时，对个人反复互动，在潜在的合作情况。使用重复的n人囚徒困境博弈，我们考虑是否互惠利他主义也可能演变时，社会互动涉及更多的个人。 我们表明，互惠合作的发展条件，使集团规模的增加变得极其有限。
Recently, several authors have investigated the evolution of reciprocal altruism using the repeated prisoner''s dilemma game. These models suggest that natural selection is likely to favor behavioral strategies leading to reciprocal cooperation when pairs of individuals interact repeatedly in potentially cooperative situations. Using the repeated n-person prisoner''s dilemma game, we consider whether reciprocal altruism is also likely to evolve when social interactions involve more individuals. We show that the conditions that allow the evolution of reciprocal cooperation become extremely restrictive as group size increases.