Target Abnormal Returns Associated with Acquisition Announcements: Payment, Acquisition Form, and Managerial Resistance
Target Abnormal Returns Associated with Acquisition Announcements: Payment, Acquisition Form, and Managerial Resistance
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DOI：
10.1016/0304-405x(87)90008-0
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发表时间：
1987-12
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Yen-Sheng Huang;Ralph A. Walkling
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Yen-Sheng Huang;Ralph A. Walkling
目标公司在最初宣布收购时获得的异常回报与支付方式、抵抗程度和要约类型有关。结果表明，这些特征之间的相互依赖是很重要的。以往的研究表明，要约收购目标获得更高的异常收益比合并目标。然而，在控制了支付方式和抵制程度之后，要约收购和并购的异常收益率差异并不显著。与未被拒绝的要约相比，被拒绝的要约的回报率并不高。与现金要约相关的异常回报率显著高于与股票要约相关的异常回报率。
Abnormal returns earned by target firms at the time of initial acquisition announcements are related to form of payment, degree of resistance, and type of offer. Results indicate that interdependence among these characteristics is important. Previous research suggests that tender-offer targets earn higher abnormal returns than merger targets. After controlling for payment method and degree of resistance, however, the difference in abnormal returns between tender offers and mergers is insignificant. Resisted offers are associated with insignificantly higher returns than unresisted offers. Abnormal returns associated with cash offers are significantly higher than those associated with stock offers.