Reason’s feeling: A systematic reconstruction of Kant’s theory of moral respect
Reason’s feeling: A systematic reconstruction of Kant’s theory of moral respect
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理性的感受：康德道德尊重理论的系统重构
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发表时间：
2019
期刊：
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通讯作者：
J. Noller
中科院分区：
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作者：
J. Noller
在我的论文中，我将认真对待康德关于尊重的道德感觉的令人困惑的陈述，根据他的说法，这是“一种通过理性概念自我形成的感觉，因此特别不同于”所有普通的感觉。我将集中于康德先验唯心主义框架内的道德尊重感的系统地位。通过考虑它的意志结构，我认为一个相容的道德感的尊重，根据这两个理智主义和情感主义的解释是真实的帐户。因此，尊重可以理解为道德自我意识和自我形成的过程，这意味着意志必须摆脱最初的经验动机，最终只由理性原则决定。
Abstract In my paper, I shall take seriously Kant’s puzzling statements about the moral feeling of respect, which is, according to him, “a feeling self-wrought by means of a rational concept and therefore specifically different” from all common feelings. I will focus on the systematic position of the moral feeling of respect within the framework of Kant’s transcendental idealism. By considering its volitional structure, I argue for a compatibilist account of the moral feeling of respect, according to which both intellectualist and affectivist interpretations are true. As such, respect can be understood in terms of a process of moral self-consciousness and self-formation, which means that the will must be freed from initial empirical motives, and finally be determined only by rational principles.