A differential oligopoly game for optimal production planning and water savings
A differential oligopoly game for optimal production planning and water savings
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DOI：
10.1016/j.ejor.2017.07.016
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发表时间：
2017-07
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Baogui Xin;Minghe Sun
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Baogui Xin;Minghe Sun
将生产计划单决策问题推广为生产计划与节水双决策问题。利用一个产品价格具有粘性且存在水权交易的微分寡头博弈模型来研究这一问题。与以往的研究文献中出现的，在这项研究中的决策同时影响的产品和水权价格。静态，开环，闭环和反馈平衡进行了分析，以显示最佳的生产计划和节水决策。最后分析了寡头竞争对社会福利的影响。数值模拟了不同参数变化时的最优解。结果表明，企业的最优生产计划和节水决策受到水效率、初始水权分配和水权保留价格的强烈影响。
A production planning single-decision problem is extended to a production planning and water saving dual-decision problem. A differential oligopoly game in which product prices are sticky and water right trading occurs is used to study this problem. Unlike previous studies appeared in the literature, the decisions in this study are affected simultaneously by both the product and the water right prices. Static, open-loop, closed-loop and feedback equilibria are analyzed to show optimal production plans and water saving decisions. The impact of oligopoly competition on the social welfare is finally analyzed. Different optimal solutions as the values of the parameters change are also simulated numerically. The results show that the firms’ optimal production plans and water saving decisions are strongly influenced by the water efficiency, initial water right allocations and water right reservation prices.