Efficient Firm Dynamics in a Frictional Labor Market
Efficient Firm Dynamics in a Frictional Labor Market
复制标题
DOI：
10.1257/aer.20131702
复制
发表时间：
2011-01
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
L. Kaas;Philipp Kircher
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
L. Kaas;Philipp Kircher
将企业规模引入劳动力搜寻模型提出了一个问题，即当平均产量和边际产量不同时，工资如何确定。我们开发并分析了现有谈判框架的替代方案：企业通过公开发布长期合同来竞争劳动力。在这种竞争性的搜索环境中，企业不仅通过发布更多的职位空缺来实现更快的增长，而且还通过提供更高的终身工资来吸引更多的工人，从而以更高的概率填补空缺，这与经验主义相一致。该模型还捕捉到了其他一些关于公司规模、工作流和薪酬的观察结果。与谈判模型相反，效率在创造和破坏就业机会的所有边际上都能获得，无论是特殊冲击还是总体冲击。规划器的解决方案允许一个易于处理的表征，这是有用的计算应用程序。
The introduction of firm size into labor search models raises the question how wages are set when average and marginal product differ. We develop and analyze an alternative to the existing bargaining framework: Firms compete for labor by publicly posting long–term contracts. In such a competitive search setting, firms achieve faster growth not only by posting more vacancies, but also by offering higher lifetime wages that attract more workers which allows to fill vacancies with higher probability, consistent with empirical regularities. The model also captures several other observations about firm size, job flows, and pay. In contrast to bargaining models, efficiency obtains on all margins of job creation and destruction, both with idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks. The planner solution allows a tractable characterization which is useful for computational applications.