Macro-Level Determinants of Local Government Interaction
Macro-Level Determinants of Local Government Interaction
复制标题
地方政府互动的宏观决定因素
DOI：
10.1177/1078087414530546
复制
发表时间：
2015
影响因子：
2.1
通讯作者：
Yu Shi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
R. Hendrick;Yu Shi
关于政府竞争与合作的实证和理论研究确定了几个重要的宏观层面的特征，这些特征可能影响同一大辖区内地方政府之间的互动形式。这些特征是政府分散、政府财政分散、政府对人口分类以及州和地方政府之间分散的财政责任。本研究提出了衡量这些特征的指标，并探讨了美国人口超过100万的大都市地区如何分布在这些指标上。该研究还探讨了这些地区如何比较可能激励市政府之间的销售税竞争的条件。
Empirical and theoretical research on government competition and collaboration identifies several important macro-level characteristics that can affect these forms of interaction between local governments within the same large jurisdiction. These characteristics are fragmentation of governments, fiscal dispersion of governments, sorting of population by governments, and decentralized fiscal responsibility between state and local governments. This study presents indices to measure these characteristics and examines how metropolitan regions in the United States with populations greater than one million are distributed on these indices. The study also examines how these regions compare on conditions that are likely to motivate sales tax competition between municipal governments.